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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3428 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMERS TALLEY, Firefighter, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY; MAYOR OF ATLANTIC CITY, NEW 
JERSEY; LARANZO LANGFORD; ATLANTIC CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, NEW 
JERSEY; BENJAMIN F. BRENNER, The Atlantic City New Jersey's Fire Departments 
Chief Engineer (Retired March 1, 2004); JOHN BEREHEIKO, Newly appointed Chief 
Engineer; STEVEN S. SMOGER, City Solicitor for the City of Atlantic City; EILEEN 
LINDINGER, Assistant Solicitor; TIMOTHY PINSKY, Medical review officer 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01146) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 16, 2010 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : January 13, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 James Talley, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 
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his motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
I 
 This appeal is the latest step in a protracted case.  In 2004, Talley filed in the 
District Court an employment discrimination complaint against his former employer, the 
City of Atlantic City, and others.
1
  In January 2005, the District Court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Talley filed an appeal, which we dismissed as untimely.  
See Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No. 05-3780 (order filed November 22, 2005).  In 
February 2007, after filing numerous unsuccessful post-judgment motions, Talley filed in 
the District Court a motion to reopen his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(3).  The defendants opposed the motion and renewed a previously-denied motion 
for sanctions.  The District Court denied Talley’s motion to reopen and assessed $250 in 
attorneys’ fees against him.  Talley appealed, and we again dismissed his appeal as 
untimely.  See Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No. 07-4074 (order filed September 11, 
2008). 
 Nearly two years later, Talley filed in the District Court this motion to reopen.  He 
alleged, much as he did in his 2007 motion to reopen, that the defendants engaged in 
fraudulent behavior and professional misconduct during discovery.  The District Court 
denied the motion, relying on the reasoning articulated in its 2007 order denying the first 
motion to reopen.  Talley filed a timely notice of appeal. 
                                                 
1
  Talley challenged his termination as a firefighter for Atlantic City, which occurred 
after he twice tested positive for cocaine use. 
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II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  We construe Talley’s motion to reopen as seeking relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).
2
  We review the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) for 
abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 “This court has consistently held that the Rule 60(b)(6) ground for relief from 
judgment provides for extraordinary relief and may only be invoked upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 
1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  This requires a showing of “an 
extreme and unexpected hardship.”  Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255.  Talley has not 
alleged that he has endured any such hardship.  Rather, he reiterates his belief that the 
defendants were not forthcoming in responding to his discovery requests.  His bare 
allegations, however, do not warrant reopening his case, nor do they appear to have any 
bearing on the District Court’s ultimate conclusion that his federal complaint was time-
barred.  The fact that he has consulted with an attorney who agrees -- to some extent, at 
least -- that the defendants should have provided Talley with documents that he requested 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2
  Rule 60(b) provides six grounds under which a litigant can obtain relief from a final 
judgment.  Talley cannot seek relief under subsections 1 through 3, as they are subject 
to a one-year time limitation.  Nor is there any basis to conclude that the judgment is 
void, see Rule 60(b)(4), or that “the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged. . . .”  Rule 60(b)(5).   
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does not constitute an exceptional circumstance.  We conclude that the District Court 
properly denied Talley’s motion to reopen. 
 On a final note, we caution Talley that, if he persists in raising legally frivolous 
arguments in the District Court or before this Court, he may face further sanctions for 
such conduct. 
 As this appeal presents no substantial questions, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.   
